2011-04-18 22:59:03 by chort
Thus far, all the speculation I've seen regarding the RSA SecurID breach centered on speculation that if attackers could somehow discover the serial numbers of tokens in use, they could derive the seed and whittle it down to 1-factor authentication. The advice from RSA certainly lends credibility to that theory, since they're essentially telling customers to double the length of the PINs in use, exponentially increasing the difficulty of guessing that factor.
If we accept the claim (and I am not suggesting we should merely for being asked to) by RSA that the attack was sponsored by an arm of the Chinese Communist government (let's drop the diplomatic "APT" BS), then perhaps there is another threat vector we haven't considered. As we know, plenty of counterfeit gear is manufactured in China. There is also speculation that what was stolen was not the seed database itself, but the serial-to-seed mapping algorithm. Imagine if they were able to create knock-off SecurID tokens that actually worked, then pollute the supply chain through resellers, and have them end up in organizations that are later targeted for break-ins.
It's clear from past behavior, the Chinese government and/or military are willing to take the long view on industrial espionage. I'm sure they wouldn't mind waiting for this gear to infiltrate high-value organizations. Besides, imagine if they added a few "bonus" features to the tokens, such as cellular radios, and microphones.
No, I don't have any inside information, this is all speculation on my part. This is just an angle I haven't heard anyone mention yet.
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